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DiVita: Conflicts between the West Virginia Landlord's Lien and Article N

CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE WEST VIRGINIA

LANDLORD'S LIEN AND ARTICLE NINE
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
NICHOLAS L. DIVITA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the interplay and conflict between liens given
landlords in West Virginia for the collection of rent and the legal rights given
secured parties under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).1
It is clear that Article 9 does not apply to a landlord's lien.' It is less than
clear whether Article 9 affects the priority to be given a landlord's lien when
it conflicts with an Article 9 security interest in the same goods.' This article
discusses in general the relationship and in particular the priority between a
landlord's lien in West Virginia and a competing Article 9 security interest in
the same goods.4 This article considers landlord's liens in other jurisdictions
to the extent necessary to illustrate how those jurisdictions have treated conflicts between landlords and Article 9 claimants. Presently, there are no decisions in West Virginia construing the relationship between a landlord's lien
and an Article 9 security interest.
II.
A.

LANDLORD'S LIENS IN WEST VIRGINIA

Common Law

At common law, the landlord had no lien againt the tenant's property.5
When rent became delinquent the landlord had a common law remedy of
distress, whereby he was authorized to distrain property of the tenant, and
hold it as a sort of pledge to secure payment of rent.'
There was no official intervention in the landlord's common law distress
remedy.' The landlord was not permitted to sell distrained property to
satisfy the rent claim.'
* J.D., 1982, West Virginia University; Associate, Bowles, McDavid, Graff & Love,
Charleston, West Virginia.
' See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code-Secured Transactions and the West Virginia
Landlord'sLien, 65 W. VA. L. REV. 40 (1962). W. VA. CODE §§ 46-1-101 to -104 (1966 & Supp. 1983),
as amended, constitute this state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2 W. VA. CODE § 46-9-104(b) (1966 & Supp. 1983).
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
Of course there is no priority issue where the lien claimants do not desire the same property.
5 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1304 at 474
(1959) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON].
R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6:21 (1980 & Supp. 1983) [here-

inafter cited as SCHOSHINSKI].
7 Note, ConstitutionalLaw- West Virginia'sDistressfor Rent Law-A Landlords Remedy
vs. a Tenant's Protections,74 W. VA. L. REV. 170, 175 n.23 (1971).
'Id.
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At common law, the landlord acquired no interest in the property of the
tenant unless and until it was distrained; it was the landlord's actual or constructive possession of the tenant's property, if anything, that allowed him to
claim the property as against the tenant's other creditors.'
B.

Statutory Liens

1.

Statutory Distress

In West Virginia, the common law remedy of distress has not been in
terms abolished, but has been modified."0 The statutes provide that a landlord
may, by presenting an appropriate affidavit to a justice of the peace
(magistrate), obtain a distress warrant which authorizes a sheriff to distrain
or levy upon the tenant's personal property, and later sell it, to satisfy the
rent claim.11
The requirement of official issuance of the distress warrant and the
landlord's power to sell distrained property are the two substantive differences between common law and statutory distress in West Virginia.12
Certain procedural aspects of the distress statutes were declared facially
unconstitutional in 1972;"8 however, given compliance with constitutional preseizure notice and hearing requirements, or the existence of exigent circumstances, it would seem that the remedy is still available.1
THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 482; Note, supra note 1, at 41.
Note, supra note 1, at 42.
" W. VA. CODE § 37-6-12 (1966 & Supp. 1983) provides as follows:
§ 37-6-12. Distress for rent; time and place; warrant.
Rent may be distrained for within one year after the time it becomes due, and not
afterwards, whether the lease be ended or not. The distress shall be made by any sheriff
or constable of the county wherein the premises yielding the rent or some part thereof
may be or the goods liable to distress may be found, under a warrant from a justice
founded upon the affidavit of the person claiming the rent, or his agent, that the amount
of money or other thing to be distrained for (to be specified in the affidavit), as he verily
believes, is justly due to the claimant for rent reserved upon contract from the person of
whom it is claimed.
12 Note, supra note 7, at 175 n.23.
'3 State ex reL/ Payne v. Walden, 156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972); see also Shaffer v.
Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
" The holding in State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972), was expressly limited to procedural aspects of the distraint statute. Then Justice Halden observed:
Undoubtedly, there are special characteristics incident to the landlord-tenant relationship which may justify statutory treatment inapplicable to other litigants. The tenant is, by definition, in possession of property of the landlord. Unless the law leaves an
aggrieved landlord to his own devices, the legislature must provide a judicial mechanism
of relative swiftness to prevent the withholding tenant from denying the landlord the
right of income incident to ownership by the tenant's refusal to pay rent and by his prevention of rental or sale to a third party. Many expenses of the landlord continue to accrue, whether the tenant pays his rent or not. Prompt judicial conclusion of disputes is
"
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West Virginia is one of the few jurisdictions having a statute establishing
priority between the distraining landlord and other lien creditors of the tenant. "Absent such a provision, it has generally been held that the landlord
does not acquire an interest in the property of the tenant until the distress
warrant is issued."15 In West Virginia, however, the provision has enabled
the supreme court of appeals to hold that the distraint lien under section
37-6-13 attaches at the instant the property is brought on to the leased
premises.16 If the tenant's personal property is carried on to the leased
premises subject to a creditor's lien which is valid against other creditors of
the lessee, the landlord will, upon issuance of the distress warrant and levy,

have rights only in the tenant's equity in such property.17 If, on the other

hand, the tenant's personalty is first subjected to a lien after it has already
come upon the leased premises, then the landlord's lien by distraint takes
complete priority over the lien of a competing creditor of the tenant in such

property. 8

The operation of this provision is particularly apparent with respect to
desirable to prevent subjecting the landlord to undeserved economic loss and the tenant
to unmerited harassment or dispossession of his actions and rental agreement provide
otherwise.
Id. at 64, 190 S.E.2d at 778.
Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762, 766 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), also indicates the validity of distress statutes given constitutional compliance. Distraint is not a dead letter. VA. CODE § 55-232-1
(1981). The court further noted in Payne that the infirmity of the statute may not apply in cases of
extraordinary State or creditor interest. 156 W. Va. at 76, 190 S.E.2d at 779. Finally, the court
stated that "[olur holding goes no further" than to invalidate procedural aspects of the distress
statute. Id. Therefore, given notice and opportunity to be heard, there does not appear to be any
constitutional defect in a court order permitting distraint to be made. Once distraint occurs, the
landlord's lien rights and the rights of the tenant's other creditors could be decided by a court in
the course of a civil action. See infra note 79.
" SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, at § 6:21 at 434.
"I Brown v. Woody, 98 W. Va. 512, 127 S.E. 325

(1925) (interpreting Ch. 93 § 11, Code of West
Virginia, 1923, identical predecessor to W. VA. CODE § 37-6-13 (1966)). W. VA. CODE § 37-6-13 reads
as follows:
§ 37-6-13. Property subject to distress.
The distress may be levied on any goods of the lessee, or his assignee or undertenant, found on the premises, or which may have been removed therefrom not more than
thirdy days. If the goods of such lessee, assignee or undertenant, when carried on the
premises, are subject to a lien which is valid against his creditors, his interest only in
such goods shall be liable to such distress. If any lien be created thereon while they are
upon the leased premises, they shall be liable to distress, but for not more than one
year's rent, whether it shall have accrued before or after the creation of the lien. No
goods shall be liable to distress other than such as are declared to be so liable in this section.
The statute defines priority of competing liens, in terms of "property subject to distress."
" Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S.E. 735 (1925); Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 31
S.E. 998 (1898), overruled on other grounds, 156 W. Va. 52, 190 S.E.2d 779 (1972).
," Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 31 S.E. 998 (1898), overruled on other grounds, 156 W.
Va. 52, 190 S.E.2d 779 (1972); see also Huffard v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E. 124 (1902).
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property distrained after it is first carried on the leased premises not subject
to any lien. In that event, the lien by distraint is said to "relate back" from
the date of distraint to the time the disputed personal property first comes
upon the leased premises to defeat intervening liens.19 The important question is whether the property is subject to a lien, valid against the lessee's
creditors, when it is first brought upon the property. Determining priority
with the lien created by statutory distress is a relatively straightforward
matter.
2.

Liens by Operation of Law

Many jurisdictions have statutes that give the landlord a lien on the tenant's property by operation of law to secure payment of rent."0 Such liens
exist independently of any contract or act of the landlord to distrain or levy
upon property of the tenant.2 As a rule, notice of the statutory lien need not
be recorded.'
The West Virginia statute does not in terms give the landlord a lien.
Rather, with regard to property to which it applies, it forbids removal by a
competing lien creditor unless such creditor satisfies the landlord's rent
claim, not to exceed one year's rent. This preferential right of payment
operates as and has been held to constitute a lien.'
The question of when the landlord's statutory lien arises under statutes
" Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Indian Rock Bottling Co., 98 W. Va. 269, 126 S.E. 715 (1925);
Bartlett v. Loundes, 34 W. Va. 493, 12 S.E. 762 (1890).
' SCHOSHInSKI, supra note 6, at § 6:22 at 435.
2 THOMPSON, supra note 5, at § 1304 at 490 (1959 & Supp. 1981).
2 Id. at 491.
1 Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 31 S.E. 998 (1898), overruled on other grounds, 156 W.
Va. 52, 190 S.E.2d 779 (1972). W. VA. CODE § 37-6-18 provides:
§ 37-6-18. Removal of goods by third party having lien.
If, after the commencement of any tenancy, a lien be obtained or created by trust
deed, mortgage, or otherwise, upon the interest or property in goods on premises leased
or rented, of any person liable for the rent, the party having such lien may remove such
goods from the premises on the following terms, and not otherwise, that is to say: On
the terms of paying to the person entitled to the rent, so much as is in arrear, and securing to him so much as is to become due; what. is so paid or secured not being more altogether than a year's rent in any case. If the goods be taken under legal process, the officer executing it shall, out of the proceeds of the goods, make such payment of what is
in arrear; and, as to what is to become due, he shall sell a sufficient portion of the goods
on a credit till then, taking from the purchaser bond, with good security, payable to the
person so entitled, and delivering such bond to him. If the goods be not taken under
legal process, such payment and security shall be-made and given before their removal.
Neither this nor any other section of this article shall affect any lien for taxes or levies.
The constitutionality of this statute was acknowledged in In re McIntire, 142 F. 593 (N.D. W. Va.
1906). Section 37-6-18 is a lineal descendant of the Act for the Better Security of Rents, 8 Anne, ch.
14, § 1 (1709). See American Exchange Bank v. Goodlee Realty Corp., 135 Va. 204, 116 S.E. 505
(1923).
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similar to section 37-6-18 is a source of some confusion. The cases are few and
very unclear, and say indiscriminately that the lien may arise when the
tenancy begins,24 when the tenant's property is brought upon the leased
premises" or when the property is brought upon the premises, then relating
back to the commencement of the tenancy." Depending upon which time the
statutory landlord's lien actually arises, the relative rights of the landlord as
against a competing lien creditor will of course vary.
C.

ContractualLandlord's Liens

If the lease provides that the landlord is to have a lien against certain of
the tenant's personal property to secure payment of rent, there is no doubt
that the rights and duties of the landlord with respect to the lien are governed by Article 9 of the UCC, which governs all consensual liens against personal property.'

III. ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The other body of law one must examine to understand the priority as
between a landlord and a secured party competing for the same property is
28
Article 9 of the UCC.
Article 9 is a comprehensive system of rules and definitions governing
every kind of consensual arrangement intended to create a security interest
in personal property or fixtures. While Article 9 abolished none of the precode security devices such as the chattel mortgage, the conditional sale, the
factor's lien and the trust receipt, it makes distinctions along functional instead of formal lines, and applies to "every transaction (regardless of form)
which is intended to create a security interest...."'
24 United States v. Lawler, 201 Va. 686, 112 S.E.2d 921 (1960) (construing identical statute).
See also THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 491; Note, supra note 1, at 43.
2 In re Balistreri, 8 B.R. 703 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (case fails to mention the invalidating effect in bankruptcy of 11 U.S.C. § 545(3) on the landlord's lien, but does indicate the current vitality
of the landlord's lien). See also Dingess Run Coal Co. v. Draper Eagle Coal Co., 108 W. Va. 37, 150
S.E. 228 (1929).
1 United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
' In re King Furniture City, 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965). Cases such as these drive
home the consensual nature of Article 9 interests, regardless of the context in which they are
cast. It is perhaps a misnomer to even include contractual landlord's liens as a species of landlord
liens under West Virginia law. It is settled that the exclusion of U.C.C. § 9-104(b) refers to nonconsensual landlord's liens, and not any personal property lien in favor of a landlord. Todsen v.
Runge, 211 Neb. 226, 318 N.W.2d 88 (1982); see In re Leckie Freeburn Coal Co., 405 F.2d 1043 (6th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom, Foster v. Hamblin, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
" W. VA. CODE §§ 46-9-101 to -507 (1966 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter all citations will refer to
the 1977 version of the Uniform Commercial Code].
U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
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Once it is determined that a particular transaction comes within the
operation of Article 9, two analytical concepts becomes important. The first
of these is "attachment" and the second is "perfection."
"Attachment" refers to the process by which a security interest becomes
legally enforceable .against the debtor. Section 9-203 states the conditions for
the attachment of a security interest. Section 9-203 functions much as a
statute of frauds."
"Perfection" alludes to the status of the secured party's right to collateral relative to the rights of other creditors claiming the same collateral.
It is axiomatic that the debtor can never raise the secured party's
unperfected status as a defense to the secured party's exercise of Article 9
rights and powers." In most cases, perfection of a security interest requires
the filing of a financing statement.32
A security interest cannot be perfected before it attaches. "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable steps
required for perfection have been taken. If such steps are taken before the
'
security interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches. 'M
U.C.C. § 9-203 provides in pertinent part:
A security is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless:
a. ... the debtor has signed a security agreement containing a description of the
collateral...
b. value has been given; and
c. the debtor has rights in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-203 (1)(a)-(c). A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all the events
specified in U.C.C. § 9-2031)(a-(c) have occured unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching. U.C.C. § 9-203(2). The statute of frauds effect of section 9-203 is supported by comment 5
to that section. See WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 23-3 at 903 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
" An unperfected security interest is as good against the interest of a person who is not a
"lien creditor," see U.C.C. § 9-301(3), as a perfected security interest is against an unperfected
security interest. "[I]n a dispute between the secured creditor and the debtor, the unperfected
condition of the security interest is quite irrelevant; so too, if creditors of the debtor have not advanced to the status of 'lien creditors,' they are also subject to the security interest." T. QUINN,
QUINN's UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 9-30[A][1] (Supp. No. 2 1982).
In In re Estate of Yealick, 69 Ill.
App.3d 353, 387 N.E.2d 399 (1979), a party who did not achieve
"lien creditor" status was subordinate to the rights of an unperfected secured party. Also see
U.C.C. § 9-201, which contains the "golden rule" of priority for Article 9 cases. WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 30, § 25-2 at 1031 (1980).
'2A
security interest can be perfected in one of three ways: (1)by possession of the collateral
pursuant to agreement; U.C.C. § 9-305; (2) by the filing of a financing statement; U.C.C. § 9-302; (3)
or by automatic perfection, permitted under several provisions of the U.C.C. See WHITE & SUM.
MERS, supra note 30, § 23-6 at 919.
' U.C.C. § 9-303(1). This is no more than saying that a security interest must be valid against
the debtor before it can be valid against anyone else. See In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich.
1969).
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Also, unless dictated otherwise by the UCC, a security agreement is effective
against other creditors. Unless a creditor can fit himself into a status treated
over a secured party, perfected or not, the
by the UCC as having priority
34
secured party should prevail.
Priorities between an Article 9 unperfected secured creditor and most
non-UCC creditors are determined by section 9-301. Priorities as between
two Article 9 secured parties are governed by section 9-312, the heart of
which, section 9-312(5), embodies the ancient rule of "first in time, first in
right."'
As this article is concerned with the priority between an Article 9
secured creditor and a landlord, further discussion of section 9-312 itself is
not really necessary. However, as will be developed later, despite Article 9's
ostensible inapplicability to landlord's liens, section 9-301 may have
something to say about who wins a priority battle between a landlord and a
secured party when the tenant/debtor defaults on his obligation to each.
IV.

THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE LANDLORD'S LIEN
AND THE ARTICLE 9 CLAIMANT

A.

The Approach of the Courts

Thus far, this article has directed attention to the law that gives the
landlord and the secured creditor rights against the tenant's personalty. Now
the article discusses the legal analysis the courts have used to determine the
competing claims of a landlord and a secured party when each is asserting
rights to the tenant's property.
1.

Majority

Most jurisdictions that have considered the question take the UCC at its
word and hold that, because Article 9 states that it "does not apply to a
landlord's lien," the priority between an Article 9 security interest and a
landlord's lien is governed by the pre- or non-UCC priority rules of the
jurisdiction whose law governs the case 3 As one might expect, since fortynine of the states have adopted the UCC, the results in these cases have
varied with the particular jurisdiction's pre- or non-UCC law.
' In re Estate of Yealick, 69 Ill. App.3d 353, 387 N.E.2d 399 (1979). Anderson v. First Jacksonville Bank, 243 Ark. 977, 423 S.W.2d 273 (1978); Central Nat'l. Bank v. Wonderland Realty Co.,
38 Mich. App. 76, 195 N.W.2d 768 (1972).
- WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 25-4 at 1036. The location and significance of U.C.C. §
9-312(5) in U.C.C. § 9-312 have been likened to "ambergris in a whale." T. QUINN, UCC COMMEN9-312[A][21 (1980).
TARY LAW & DIGEST
- See, e.g., Hartwell v. Hartwell Co., 107 N.J. Super. 91, 400 A.2d 529 (1979); see also United
States v. S.K.A. Assoc., Inc., 600 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979) (U.S. Small Business Administration
must play by same priority rules as any other creditor; Florida law subordinated perfected security interest to landlord's lien). See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 1006 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
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The pre- or non-UCC law of some jurisidctions prescribes that landlord's
liens are superior to other types of liens, including Article 9 security interests, and gives automatic victory to the landlord. 7 In other states, the preor non-UCC rule is that a creditor's rights under a chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract, pre-code security devices, are superior to a landlord's
lien, and the courts have therefore given victory to the secured party. 8 Still
other states have non-UCC rules that award priority to the landlord or the
secured party depending upon whose interest first "attached" to the tenant's
property. 9 Although outcomes may vary, all of these approaches may be
reconciled by their use of pre-or non-UCC law as the rule of decision.
2.

Minority

A minority has interpreted the exclusion of section 9-104(b) in light of the
spirit and purpose of the UCC as a whole. This approach stresses the idea
that Article 9 was intended by its drafters to be a comprehensive and preemptive statement in the area of secured transactions in personal property.'
This view interprets section 9-104(b) to mean that Article 9 does not apply to
the creation of landlord's lien or the priority of landlord's liens inter se.
However, if an Article 9 security interest is engaged in a priority dispute
with another lien against the same property, the goals and policies of Article
9 can be accomplished only if Article 9 supplies the rule of priority. Accordingly, this approach has treated landlord lienors as "lien creditors" within the
priority provisions of UCC section 9-301(b), and has used non-UCC rules to
determine when the landlord achieved "lien creditor" status for purposes of
41
priority resolution. '
Predictably, West Virginia has no decision interpreting section 9-104(b) of
the UCC. However, were the court to adopt the majority approach, it would
likely fall into line with those jurisdictions that award priority to the lien
2
that first attaches.4

' In re Einhorn Bros., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors, Inc., 246 Md. 380, 228 A.2d 963 (1967).
Bates & Springer v. Friermood, 109 Ariz. 203, 507 P.2d 668 (1973).
' National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975).
'o See note 76 infra and accompanying text. "Article 9 is the most novel division in the Code.
It is designed to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present day secured financing transactions can be effected with less cost and greater certainty."
SPEIDEL, SUMMERS & WHITE, COMMERCIAL & CONSUMER LAW 21 (1981).
" Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 Ill. App.3d 379, 350 N.E.2d 356 (1976).
42 This assertion can be made because no provision of Chapter 37, Article 6 of the West Virginia Code provides for automatic superiority of either the landlord's lien or the competing lien. A
"security interest" includes a lien. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). If the landlord's lien is a "security interest,"
Note, supra note 1, at 43, it is not the kind of security interest whose creation is governed by Article 9.
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B.

The Relationship of the West Virgina Landlord's Lien to the
Article 9 Security Interest

1.

When Landlord's Liens Arise in West Virginia

a. Landlord'sLien by Distraint.It was noted earlier that the landlord's
lien under the distraint statute has priority over the lien of a competing
creditor to the extent that the tenant's property is first brought upon the
leased premises unencumbered by a lien which is valid against the tenant's
creditors. 3 If encumbered by a lien which is valid against the tenant's
creditors when first brought upon the leased premises, then the landlord has
rights only to the tenant's equity in such property.44
These requirements should be considered closely. Under section 37-6-13,
the legislature has mandated that if a creditor's lien arises with respect to
property of the tenant after it is on the premises, then such creditor is entitled to only what the distraining landlord leaves, if anything, after taking
up to one year's rent from the proceeds of a sale of the property. This makes
some sense if one assumes in the first instance that the landlord ought to
have some noncontractual lien against the tenant's property.
The second requirement, however, that the lien be valid against the
lessee's creditors, adds a peculiar twist to the secured party's position. Section 37-6-13 necessitates that the secured party have a perfected security interest in the property at the time it is taken upon the property, or else his interest is subordinate to that of a distraining landlord. The effect of the West
Virginia distress statute as it relates to Article 9 of the UCC is to benefit the
landlord by placing him in a class of persons who can defeat a perfected
security interest on the happen stance of the physical location of the collateral when a security interest therein is perfected, even though the
landlord never has to comply with any notice or filing requirements to
disclose to potential Article 9 creditors that the tenant's property may be
subject to a landlord's lien. It should be recalled, for example, that even if a
lease begins on January 1, and unencumbered property is brought on to the
leased premises on January 8, a creditor who gets and perfects a security interest in such property on June 1 will lose priority to a landlord who causes
distraint to be made on such property on, say, December 1. The key to
priority under section 37-6-13 is whether the property is encumbered by a
lien, valid against the lessee's creditors, when brought on to the property.45
b.

'"

Landlord'sLien by Operationof Law. Section 37-6-18 of the Code also

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

" See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

"s Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S.E. 735 (1925); Huffard v. Akers, 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E.
124 (1903).
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gives the landlord a lien, but does so quite independently of any distraint or
other act by the landlord."
However, section 37-6-18 is ambiguous as to the time the lien it contemplates arises in favor of the lessor. The ambiguity obtains because it is
not made clear in the relevant decisional law whether the lien arises at the
instant the lease begins, when the property comes on the leased premises, or
in a combination of the first two alternatives, at the time the property comes
on to the leased premises, then relating back to the beginning of the tenancy.
Some support exists for each of these three views."
The two reported decisions in West Virginia interpreting the statute
shed no light on the issue. Anderson v. Henry 8 merely recites the rule that
the statute actually creates a lien in favor of the landlord with no action required by him. Huffard v. Akers49 erroneously discusses the statute in circumstances requiring application of the distraint statute only, and is thus of
no use in resolving the problem.
The Virginia court has on several occasions interpreted its analogue of
section 37-6-18. That court's decisions create the distinct possibility that a
landlord's statutory lien dates not just from the time the tenant's property
comes on to the premises, but from the time the lease begins.
In United States v. Waddill Holland & Flinn, Inc.," the Supreme Cburt
of Appeals of Virginia held that a landlord's lien under that state's statute
(identical to section 37-6-18) "relates back to the beginning of the tenancy."
The lien was held to qualify as "duly perfected" from such date within the
meaning of Virginia unemployment compensation lien statute awarding
priority to competing liens that achieved such a status before the accrual of
the state's claim for unemployment compensation taxes.'1
The rule in the Waddill case was reinforced in United States v. Lawler. 2
In that case the court ruled that for all state law purposes, a landlord's
statutory lien is specific, not inchoate, and relates back to the day the lease
begins."
West Virginia law is silent on the issue of when the landlord's statutory
lien arises. But if the Virginia cases are to be taken seriously, as inter-

, Thomas Co. v. Lewis Hubbard & Co., 79 W. Va. 138, 90 S.E. 816 (1916).
'7 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
48 45 W. Va. 319, 31 S.E. 998 (1898), overruled on other grounds, 156 W. Va. 52, 190 S.E.2d 779
(1972).
49 52 W. Va. 21, 43 S.E. 124 (1902).
- 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
5'Id. at 357, 28 S.E.2d at 746.
201 Va. 686, 112 S.E.2d 921 (1960).
Id. at 691, 112 S.E.2d at 926.
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pretative of an identical statute, then there is a definite possibility that the
lien section 37-6-18 contemplates is effective from the date the lease first
begins, regardless of when the tenant's property comes on to the leased
premises or whether it is encumbered by a security interest before it comes
on to the premises. This would create a situation in which the only way a
secured creditor could ensure his priority over a landlord wielding a
statutory lien that dates from the beginning of the tenancy is to attach and,
arguably, perfect his security interest before his debtor's lease begins.
2.

When an Article 9 Interest Arises

Article 9 applies to consensual liens in personal property or fixtures.5 In
the normal non-possessory secured transaction a debtor signs a security
agreement reflecting his intention to grant the secured party a security interest in certain property or property rights of the debtor to secure the debtor's performance of an obligation to the secured party.
The security interest does not become legally enforceable until all of the
requirements of section 9-203(1)(a)-(c) have been satisfied. One of these factors
is that the debtor have "rights in the collateral."5 Until the debtor has rights
in the collateral, the security interest cannot attach, and the security interest
does not legally exist.
Ordinarily, the debtor does own or have rights in the collateral, and there
is no problem. However, it is not too difficult to imagine circumstances in
which a debtor-buyer enters into a sales contract with a distant seller of
goods, "F.O.B. Buyer's plant," the goods to be transported in seller's vehicles,
cash on delivery.- In such cases, the risk of loss with respect to the goods, a
common indicia of ownership or rights to the goods, will not pass to the buyer

I In National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l. Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975), a landlord's
lien and a security in the same goods attached at the same time. The landlord's lien attached when
the property arrived on the premises and the security interest attached at the same time, because
that was when the debtor acquired rights in the collateral. The landlord in this case lost because
his originial tenant had assigned the leasehold estate to another who later defaulted on his obligations to both the landlord and the secured party. The court noted that the date of the assignment
created a new landlord-tenant relationship. The secured party had a perfected security before the
assignment of lease occurred, but not before the original lease was executed. Thus, in the court's
opinion, the "new" lessor took subject to the security interest which was perfected at the time the
assignment of lease occurred and the "new" landlord-tenant relationship created. The court implies that if the secured party's security interest had been perfected after the assignment of lease,
the landlord would have prevailed. See Chessport Millworks, Inc. v. Solis, 86 N.M. 265, 522 P.2d
812 (1974).
U.C.C. § 9-102 and official comments.
: U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c). For the importance of the debtor's rights in collateral, see Manger v.
Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Utah 1980).
U.C.C. § 9-203(2).
National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l. Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975).
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until he takes delivery at the named destination point. 9 Here, the buyerdebtor may not aquire rights in the collateral until the goods reach his place
of business. Not infrequently, the place of business may be under lease from
a commercial landlord."0
Consequently, the secured party who may have done everything ostensibly necessary to create and perfect a security interest in the buyer's goods
may find that his security interest arises only when the goods are delivered
to the buyer at the buyer's place of business. Should the debtor-buyer-lessee
later default on his obligations to the lessor and the secured party, the
secured party and lessor may find themselves locked into a full-scale priority
battle over the lessee's goods. In this kind of priority contest, the secured
party must usually venture out of the familiar Article 9 array of priority
rules and travel back into time to wrestle with the pre-Code priority rules of
the jurisdiction whose law happens to govern. 1
In a related problem, if the secured party has a security interest in the
debtor's inventory "now owned or hereafter acquired," a substantial question
may arise as to whether the secured party's security interest can attach, and
therefore become perfected, as to after-acquired inventory until the debtor
acquires rights in such after-acquired inventory.2 There is authority that the
security interest dates, even as to after-acquired property, from the time of
the original agreement although the debtor did not acquire rights in specific
property covered by the security interest until well after the date of the
agreement." This position is by no means unanimous and, indeed, is totally
rejected by the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of voidable preference
analysis. a4
C. Respects in which Article 9 and West Virginia Landlord's
Lien Conflict under the Majority Approach
1.

Distraint Lien

As was noted above, the distraint statute awards priority on the sole
basis of whether the subject property was encumbered by a lien, valid
against the lessee's creditors, when such property was first carried on to the
Goldberg Co., v. County Green Ltd. Partnership, 438 F. Supp. 693 (W.D. Va. 1977); Wood
Chevrolet Co., v. Bank of the Southeast, 352 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1977).
National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975).
" Id. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62In re Tempco Business Services, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT.: DEC. (CRR) 446 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1977).
' Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969); In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore.
1967), aff'd sub nor., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
" 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) adopts the "improvement in position" test for voidable preference analysis and eschews the authority of cases such as those cited supra note 63.
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premises. 5 A landlord has no statutory or other obligation to record public
notice of his lien under Chapter 38, Article 6 of the West Virginia Code.
The priority rules in the West Virginia distraint provisions disrupt the
symmetry of Article 9 and undermine its reliability as the exclusive body of
law to which a secured party can look for determining and predicting his
rights relative to others claiming an interest in the same goods.
For example, Article 9 contemplates that a lender who is considering
whether to extend credit to a debtor and secure that debt by taking a security interest in some of the debtor's assets need only search applicable financing statement indices to ascertain whether those assets are subject to the
prior security interest of another creditor. However, the distraint lien
operates in such a way that, even if a secured party diligently searches the
applicable financing statement indices and finds no indication of a prior
security interest in the asset against which he may lend, he will lose priority
in the asset to a distraining landlord if, by inadvertence, he waits until the
asset is placed on the leased premises before the security interest is created.
Similarly, if the secured party waits until the property is on the leased
premises before he files a financing statement, or otherwise perfects his
security interest, then even though the security interest attached before the
property was taken on to the leased premises, the landlord who later
distrains against the property will win the priority battle with the secured
party. The secured party's interest in the property must be one that is valid
against the lessee's creditors before it prevails over the lien of a distraining
landlord."
If the secured party's security interest attaches simultaneously with the
delivery or carriage of the property on to the leased premises, the secured
party runs a greater risk of losing priority to the landlord." Because perfection cannot occur prior to attachment, if the debtor acquires rights in the collateral only when the property reaches the leased premises, then the secured
party's lien will attach and, of course, be perfected only at such time and not
before. 8 Cases of simultaneous attachment of liens are, to say the least,
undesirable from the secured party's standpoint,69 especially where he has
€ Brown v. Woody, 98 W. Va. 512, 127 S.E. 325 (1925).
W. VA. CODE § 37-6-13 (1966).
, See National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l. Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975), in which simultaneous attachment of a landlord's lien and a security interest resulted in defeat of the
landlord's lien where the security interest was perfected before the landlord-tenant relationship
was created by assignment of the lease by the original tenant.
U.C.C. § 9-303(1); In re Rivet, 299 F.Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
, In National Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l. Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975), the court observed: "The dilemma we face then is the priority between a landlord's lien and security interest
which attached at the same time, namely when the Flexsteele inventory was delivered to Lyons."
88 N.M. at 516, 543 P.2d at 484.
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done everything the Code required of him to make sure he advanced credit
against unencumbered assets.
Doubtless, the incidence of landlord distraint is less common since procedural aspects of the distraint scheme were declared constitutionally
infirm." However, the remedy of distraint has by no means been abolished. 1
Thus, if the majority view of UCC section 9-104(b) were adopted, and section
37-6-13 governed conflicts between secured parties and distraining landlords,
important goals of Article 9 might be thwarted. The distraint priority section
interferes with the reliability of Article 9 as the exclusive source of the
secured party's rights to collateral, and interpretive case law requires use of
pre-Article 9 concepts and rules.
2.

The Statutory Landlord's Lien

The chief problem with a landlord's lien of the variety contained in section 37-6-18 is the distinct possibility that under interpretative decisional law,
it may come into existence as of the day the lease begins."
A secured party searching the financing statement indices will have no
occasion to believe that liens other than ones reflected in the financing
statements index, the execution lien index or the tax lien index will have any
effect on the property in which he is considering taking a security interest.
The pernicious aspect of the statutory landlord's lien is that the landlord is
obligated to do nothing to inform subsequent creditors of his claim against
the property. This idea is absolutely repugnant to the philosophy of Article
9.73

If the lien of section 37-6-18 arises when the lease begins, a secured party
will be able to ensure his priority status only by creating and, arguably,
perfecting his security interest before the lease begins.7' Under the terms of
71 There would seem to be nothing to prevent a court from authorizing a distress warrant
after a rent claim has been pursued to judgment, or even authorizing the warrant provisionally so
that levy could be made after notice and opportunity for hearing were accomplished. In that
event, due process would be satisfied and, since the priority of a distress lien depends on whether
the property was encumbered when carried on to the premises, the lien created by the distress
statute would take priority over a competing security interest not perfected before the distrained
property was carried on to the premises.
71 Distress procedures complying with constitutional requirements of notice, opportunity for
hearing and a neutral warrant issuer are quite possibly valid. See SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, at §
6:25 at 447-48. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
" Article 9 adopts the notice filing system. U.C.C. § 9-402, official comment 2.
' Compare Chessport Millworks, Inc. v. Solis, 80 N.M. 265, 522 P.2d 812 (1974) with National
Inv. Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1975). The controlling difference between these two cases is the time at which the security interest was perfected. Under New Mexico law, which, as West Virginia seems to do, dates a landlord's lien from the first day of the lease,
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an after-acquired property clause in some jurisdictions, even doing this will
not save him, as it is possible that the debtor may acquire rights in afteracquired inventory only after the lease has begun, and the security interest
will not attach and be perfected until such time.75
Moreover, even if the landlord's lien under section 37-6-18 were to arise
only when the tenant's property was brought on to the leased premises, a
much more reasonable alternative, the secured party may still have to make
sure that his security interest in such property was perfected before it
arrived at the leased premises. This, in turn, presupposes an additional
burden on the part of the secured party to ascertain in the first instance that
the collateral would ultimately be placed on premises under lease. This
burden could be significant given what must be the great volume of interstate secured transactions.
The statutory landlord's lien gives the lessor rights in specific property
of the tenant while requiring the lessor to do nothing to obtain such rights.
The secured party's lien, on the other hand, is a creature of contract. By exposing the secured party to the pitfalls and uncertainty of the statutory
landlord's lein, the reliability of Article 9 as a necessary adjunct to credit
extension decisions is jeopardized. Additional burdens are unnecessarily cast
upon the secured party. The exclusive and preemptive nature of Article 9 is
undermined.
V.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

In Peterson v. Ziegler,76 an Illinois appellate court interpreted section
9-104(b) of the UCC to mean that Article 9 "does not govern the creation of a
'77
landlord's lien or the priorities between competing landlord's liens.
However, the court observed:
In order for article nine to be the comprehensive statute that it was
meant to be on the subject of consensual security interests, article nine must
always supply a rule for determining the priorities between a consensual
security interest and any other kind of lien. Thus, despite the language of section 9-104(b), it is proper to look to article
nine for a rule of priority [between a
78
security interest and a landlord's lien].
The court in Peterson used UCC sections 9-301(1)(b) and 9-301(3) to
resolve the priority as between a landlord's lien and an Article 9 security ina security interest must be perfected prior to such date, not just attached, to achieve priority over
the landlord's lien.
" In re Tempeo Business Services, Inc., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 446 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1977).
71 39 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 350 N.E.2d 356 (1976).
" Id at 385, 350 N.E.2d at 362.
78 Id.
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terest29 Thus, under state non-UCC law, the landlord in the case did not
become a "lien creditor" until he obtained a judgment for rent, no matter
that he obtained a distress warrant before that date."' The landlord's "lien
creditor" status arose several years after the secured party had the holder of
a perfected security interest in the coveted asset of the debtor. Section
9-301(1)(b), by implication, awards priority to one who perfects his security interest before his competitor achieves "lien creditor" status."
Peterson stands alone as the only reported decision that used Article 9 to
resolve a priority battle between an Article 9 secured party and a competing
landlord's lien. This approach has been urged before other courts, but never
successfully before or after Peterson.82
It is submitted that the approach of the Peterson court has much to
recommend itself. The prevailing view subjects security interests to the
priority rules of the pre-UCC law of any one of forty-nine jurisdictions.' 3
Thus, by definition, the priority of the security interest will be judged under
a scheme of rules developed when there were conditional sales contracts,
chattel mortgages, trust receipts, pledges, equipment trusts, factor's liens,
and a special body of law governing each of these arrangements." The very
9 Id.

Id.at 385, 350 N.E.2d at 361.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 25-2 at 1031 (1980): "Section 9-301 provides ... by
negative implication that a perfected secured creditor beats a lien creditor."
Even the landlord may benefit under the Peterson v. Ziegler approach because, if he is
treated as a lien creditor, he can avoid the seemingly automatic defeat saddled upon anyone challenging a security interest who cannot arm himself with a specific Article 9 provision awarding
him priority. Those jurisdictions which do not apply Article 9 to priority contests between security interests and landlords liens ignore the clear mandate of UCC § 9-201: The secured creditor
wins unless someone can beat him by holding one of the code-created class of interests that take
priority over a security interest. This would have been an equally good rationale for the Peterson
court had it desired to apply the UCC to the priority dispute but not desired to classify the
landlord as a "lien creditor." It should be noted that if UCC § 9-201 is used to resolve a dispute between a secured party and a landlord lienor, even an unperfected secured party would prevail
over a landlord lienor. On the other than, if UCC §§ 9-301(11(b) and 9-301(3) are used to resolve
such a dispute (which is the Petersonapproach), only a previously perfected secured party would
prevail over a landlord lienor. Compare UCC § 9-201 with UCC §§ 9-301(1)(b) and 9-301(c).
A close and confirmatory analogy to the approach of using UCC § 9-201 to resolve priority
disputes between secured parties and landlord lienors is Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin,
306 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. 1983). In Griffin, the court used UCC § 9-201 to resolve a priority dispute between a secured party and the holder of a contractual right of setoff, despite that UCC § 9-104(g)
seemingly provides that Article 9 does not apply to rights of setoff. The analogy to conflicts between landlord's liens and security interests is clear.
' But see Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Van Shaw, 476 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), in which the
court followed the majority view of U.C.C. § 9-104(b) but cited U.C.C. § 9-401(2) and awarded
priority to the secured party on the basis of the landlord's actual knowledge of the contents of an
improperly filed financing statement.
See, e.g., Hartwell v. Hartwell Co., 167 N.J. Super. 91, 400 A.2d 529 (1979).
81

84

The laws governing the various kinds of security devices in a particular jurisdiction
could and did differ in significant respects. Some pre-Code devices were available with
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purpose of Article 9 was to unify and de-formalize secured transactions. 5 The
fate of the Article 9 secured party should not be determined by the rules of a
bygone legal era, when the location of "title" decided cases: it is unbecoming
of a court having any degree of understanding of the purpose of Article 9 to
measure the Article 9 security interest by the legal rules of another time.8
Moreover, because each state has its own view of how landlords ought to
fare against others claiming an interest in the personal property of a tenant,
the uniformity 7 that is one of the Code's chief goals is undermined, if not
defeated.
The drafters of Article 9, it may be assumed, consciously allocated risks,
burdens and benefits among the persons whose legal relationships were to be
governed by that body of law. To subject the secured party to the relative
unknown of a state's pre-Code priority rules disrupts that allocation of risks,
burdens and benefits. To do so may cause substantial, if not total, defeat of
the legitimate expectations of the secured creditor. Further, it may dilute the
reliability of Article 9 as a guide to the legal and financial soundness of a particular credit extension decision. This is especially true in the case of interstate credit transactions, where it may be difficult to determine applicable
law."
The above criticisms are general in nature. However, they apply to the
situation in West Virginia as well. To prevent the legal incongruence between Article 9 of the UCC and the West Virginia landlord's lien, one of the
following things could be done.
The landlord's lien statutes89 could be amended in two ways. The first
would require the landlord to file some sort of public notice that, by virtue of
respect to some types of collateral but not for others. The steps required to create a security interest varied from device to device. So, too, the requirements for perfection.
Remedies on default varied. Some laws included priority provisions and others did not.
Not all differences between devices could be rationalized. Others were wholly without

justification.
LAw 82 (1981). See Bane, Chattel Security
Comes of Age: Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 91 (1951); See In re
Yale Express System, 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966) for a court in tune with the Code's rejection of
purely formal concepts such as "title" being determinative of substantive rights.
U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2(c) and 9-102(1)(a).
Article 9 eschews "title." U.C.C. § 9-202. Justice Learned Hand had this to say about
"title:" "It seems to be a barren distinction, though indubitably true, that title does not pass upon
a conditional sale; "title" is a formal word for a purely conceptual notion; I do not know what it
means and I question whether anybody does, except perhaps legal historians." In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F.2d 326, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1935) (Hand, J., dissenting).
U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
See the labyrinthine choice of law provisions of U.C.C. § 9-103. Of course, if the UCC does
not apply in the situations covered by this article, then non-UCC choice of law rules may govern,
further thwarting the intent of the Code.
" W. VA. CODE §§ 37-6-12, -13, -18 (1966 & Supp. 1983).
SPEIDEL, SUMMERS & WHITE, COMMERCIAL & CONSUMER
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his lease, he is claiming a landlord's lien under state law. The statute could be
further amended to provide that any security interest perfected before the
landlord's filing of such notice would be superior to the landlord's lien,
regardless of the location of the property when the security interest was
perfected. The statute could also be amended to provide that no landlord's
lien could attach prior to the property's placement on the leased premises."
This would eliminate two present problems. The first problem that would
be avoided is the secured party's present inability to independently evaluate
whether the prospective debtor's assets are subject to a landlord's lien until
it is too late. The second consists in decisions such as United States v.
Lawler9 and United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc.2 which create
the legal fiction that the landlord's lien "relates back" 3 to the day the lease
began, regardless of when the property comes on to the premises. Thus, the
secured party would have a more informed and rational foundation on which
to make secured credit extension decisions, and would be on more of an equal
footing with the landlord in the event of a priority dispute.
A second alternative would be to judicially or, preferably, legislatively include a landlord claiming a nonconsensual lien as a "lien creditor" within the
meaning of UCC section 9-301(3)"' and amend the landlord's lien statutes to
provide that notwithstanding any other law or court-made rule, a landlord's
lien may not arise until the property against which the lien is asserted comes
on to the leased premises.
This would in essence codify the approach of Peterson v. Ziegler95 and
allow the court to treat the landlord as any other "lien creditor" for purposes
of UCC priority resolution as of the day the tenant's property first came on
to the leased premises.
A third approach, which is the most radical and theoretically appealing,
' This is directly contrary to those decisions which hold that the landlord's lien dates from
the beginning of the lease and not just from the time the property is brought on to the premises.
The conclusion that the landlord's lien does date from the inception of the lease is also supported
by Note, supra note 1, at 43.
201 Va. 886, 112 S.E.2d 921 (1960).
182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 771 (1944).
93

Id.

" Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 Ill. App. 3d 379, 350 N.E.2d 356 (1976). It would seem that even
under the majority view, if a court chose not to treat a landlord as a U.C.C. § 9-301(3) "lien
creditor," neither would it use U.C.C. § 9-201 to award priority to the secured party. U.C.C. §

9-201, it will be recalled, provides a sort of "safety net" to the Article 9 security interest: unless a
competing creditor can bring himself within the terms of a Code-created class of interests which
take priority over a security interest, the security interest takes priority. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text. A "lien creditor" currently includes persons who have "acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy or the like ..."U.C.C. § 9-301(3). It does not appear too difficult to understand this language to include a landlord lienor.
" See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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is to completely repeal the landlord's lien statutes. This would place the
landlord on a footing equal to that of any other creditor in the commercial
world and make any lien in favor of the landlord a function of contract rather
than a function of status. The history of landlord-tenant law shows that rules
governing that legal relationship have developed into matters of contract
from matters of somewhat reified property law.96 There is no inherent reason
today why the law should confer less financial and legal risk on the landlord
than on anyone else in the commercial world. If the landlord is to have a lien
to secure rent obligations, perhaps he should have to bargain for it.

1 In Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1979) the West Virginia court joined the
modern trend to treat leases of real property as essentially matters of contract. This represents a
rejection of the authority of the hypostatized concepts of "property" or "estates in property" as
raison d'etre of the nonconsensual landlord's lien. Our landlord's lien statutes developed in feudal
times, see St. 8 Anne, ch. 14, § 1, and carried forward to the common law of England and early
America, when legal conceptualism and formalism reigned. See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense
and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935). The historical reasons for the nonconsensual landlord's liens no longer exist. Indeed, the development of the law does and should
evince a movement from status to contract; the landlord should not, merely by reason of his status
as such, take priority over others who have extended credit to the tenant and acquired a consensual interest in the tenant's property as security.
If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to signify those
personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 174 (1906). Perhaps Maine's status-to-contract theory is applicable to the
landlord tenant situation.
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